The Early Wittgenstein on Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value by Tejedor, Chon
Research Archive
Citation for published version:
Chon Tejedor, ‘Conclusion’, in The Early Wittgenstein on 
Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value (Abingdon:  
Routledge, 2014).
DOI:
Link to book in publisher's online catalogue
Document Version: 
This is the Accepted Manuscript version of a book chapter 
published by Routledge in The Early Wittgenstein on 
Metaphysics, Natural Science, Language and Value.
The version in the University of Hertfordshire Research Archive 
may differ from the final published version.  
Copyright and Reuse: 
© 2014 Routledge
Content in the UH Research Archive is made available for 
personal research, educational, and non-commercial purposes 
only. Unless otherwise stated, all content is protected by 
copyright, and in the absence of an open license, permissions 
for further re-use should be sought from the publisher, the 
author, or other copyright holder. 
Enquiries
If you believe this document infringes copyright, please contact Research & 
Scholarly Communications at rsc@herts.ac.uk
	   208	  
CONCLUSION: 
WITTGENSTEIN’S METHOD AND THE CONTINUITY IN HIS PHILOSOPHY 
 
1. Use, Purpose and Nonsense 
 
Towards the end of chapter 6, we saw that Wittgenstein’s discussion of the principles of the 
natural sciences sheds important light on his understanding of nonsense: the principles of the 
natural sciences are neither senseful nor senseless, since, being instruction-propositions (akin to 
imperative commands), they are not truth-assessable. In spite of this, they are not nonsensical 
either, in that they serve a genuine purpose: the purpose of stipulating optional, instrumentally 
valuable, systems. From this emerges the idea that, for Wittgenstein, a proposition that is neither 
senseful nor senseless is not, for this reason, automatically nonsensical; instead, a proposition is 
nonsensical when the sign expressing it is used in a purposeless manner. Philosophy is 
characterised by a particular kind of such nonsense: the nonsense that arises from using signs in a 
self-stultifying manner.cclviii We have come across this notion of a self-stultifying use of signs 
repeatedly in this book. In chapters 2 and 6, we saw that metaphysical and ethical propositions 
involve using signs in manners that subvert themselves. This idea also emerged in chapter 5, in 
our discussion of the causal system that allows for action at a distance (AD) and the causal 
system that does not allow for action at a distance (NAD). Let us briefly revisit the example we 
considered as part of that discussion. We saw then that sentence ‘i’ (‘O causes the green ball to 
remain in r at t+1 even though it has been struck by the red ball at t’) is used in (AD) to express a 
senseful proposition i, in which ‘O’ is understood as a magnet. In (AD), i is logically analysable 
into the conjunctive proposition h expressed by ‘O is located at s at times t and t+1 and the red 
ball strikes the green ball located at r at t and the green ball remains at r at t+1’. In contrast, in 
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(NAD), i is not a senseful proposition and does not therefore have a logical analysis at all. There 
is no purpose to using ‘i’ in (NAD) in the way that it is used in (AD); there is no purpose to 
treating it as logically analysable into h. Note that there is no problem per se with using ‘i’ in this 
way – there is no problem with the symbols in question. Indeed, since both (NAD) and (AD) are 
optional systems, we could decide, on the basis of an instrumental judgement, to move from 
(NAD) to (AD), thereby ruling in this use of ‘i’ by stipulation. It is just that the unified set of 
instructions (or principles) that characterise (NAD) excludes the instruction to treat ‘i’ in this 
way: that, after all, is the entire point of (NAD). Hence, if you do attempt to follow this 
instruction whilst following other instructions from (NAD), you end up operating in a non-
unified, self-stultifying (AD-NAD) manner – one that serves no purpose. This, to my mind, is 
part of the message behind the following entry:cclix  
   
Logic must take care of itself. 
 A possible sign must also be able to signify. Everything which is possible in logic is also 
permitted. (“Socrates is identical” means nothing because there is no property which is 
called “identical”. The proposition is senseless because we have not made some arbitrary 
determination, not because the symbol is in itself unpermissible.) 
 In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic. (TLP 5.473) 
 
Sign ‘i’ cannot be used in (NAD) to express a proposition that is analysable into h, not because 
there is anything problematic about this use of ‘i’ per se – about this symbol – but because (NAD) 
does not incorporate this ‘arbitrary determination’ or stipulation; (AD), in contrast, does. 
 For Wittgenstein, the crux to the notion of proposition is that a proposition is a sign – a 
sentence – used for a particular purpose. Philosophical nonsensical propositions purport to serve 
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a particular purpose, but in fact do not do so, since their purported purpose subverts itself and 
dissolves upon examination. Insofar as they purport to serve a purpose, however, it is helpful to 
call them ‘propositions’, as Wittgenstein does throughout the Tractatus. In contrast, senseful 
propositions, the instruction-propositions that express optional principles in the natural sciences 
and the instruction-propositions that express the accidental conventions of natural languages all 
involve sentences used purposefully.cclx The purposes that these sentences serve differ greatly 
from each other, of course.  
 There is no doubt that much of Wittgenstein’s attention, in the Tractatus, is on the notion 
of the syntactic use of signs expressing senseful propositions. I do not wish to deny the 
significance of this particular notion of use in the Tractatus: it is, no doubt, an important aspect 
of the book – one that has, for good reason, been a major focus of the secondary literature.cclxi My 
aim here is simply to draw attention to a different, broader notion of use – the notion of a 
purposeful combination of signs – which is also present in the Tractatus, and which is pivotal to 
understanding Wittgenstein’s distinction between nonsensical propositions and those that are not 
nonsensical. cclxii This is a broader notion of use in that, as we have just seen, it covers not just the 
syntactical use of signs expressing senseful propositions, but also the use of signs in instruction-
propositions (e.g. the principles of the natural sciences).cclxiii It is with this broader notion of use 
in mind, I suggest, that Wittgenstein notes, in the midst of his discussion on the natural sciences 
and mathematics: 
 
(In philosophy the question “Why do we really use [‘gebrauchen’] that word, that 
proposition?” constantly leads to valuable results.) (TLP 6.211)cclxiv 
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2. The Method of the Tractatus 
 
 
For Wittgenstein, our ability to judge how and to what purposes signs are used is not dependent 
on our being presented with a theory of language, thought or representation – and, indeed, the 
Tractatus does not aim to present such a theory. On the contrary, insofar as we already have 
mastery of everyday language and thought, we already have the ability to make such judgements, 
even when we are not aware of the internal, logical structure of language. 
 
Man possesses the capacity of constructing languages, in which every sense can be 
expressed, without having an idea how and what each word means—just as one speaks 
without knowing how the single sounds are produced. (TLP 4.002) 
 
All propositions of our [everyday] language are actually, just as they are, logically 
completely in order. That simple thing which we ought to give here is not a model of the 
truth but the complete truth itself. 
 (Our problems are not abstract but perhaps the most concrete that there are.) (TLP 5.5563) 
 
‘Our problems are not abstract’ in that they are not problems to be resolved by getting to grips 
with an abstract theory. For our problems do not stem from the lack of such a theory. Instead, 
they result from the fact that, although we already have the know-how to use signs with a purpose 
and to recognise the purposeful use of signs (insofar as we already have mastery of everyday 
language and thought), our disposition to act on this know-how is at times eroded by our 
distorting philosophical practices.cclxv  
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Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are 
not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only 
state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from 
the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. 
 (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than 
the Beautiful.) 
 And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems. (TLP 
4.003) 
 
Our failure to ‘understand the logic of our language’ is not the kind of failure that would result 
from the lack of an abstract theory of language; instead, it is a failure in our practical 
understanding, a failure in our disposition to use signs. It is our disposition to act – to use signs 
in particular ways – that needs to be corrected. And, for Wittgenstein, only an activity could help 
correct such a floundering disposition to act. In his view, philosophy – properly understood – is 
to be regarded precisely as such an activity: 
  
The object [purpose – ‘Zweck’ in the original] of philosophy is the logical clarification of 
thoughts. 
 Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. 
 A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. 
 The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical propositions”, but to make 
propositions clear. 
 Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it 
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were, opaque and blurred. (TLP 4.112) 
 
The aim of this activity is to enable us to fine-tune our thinking and linguistic abilities, to orient 
our disposition to use signs away from the production of nonsense and towards the production of 
senseful pictures. Ideally, this philosophical task would be performed in an face-to-face, 
interpersonal, dialectical manner, so that our individual dispositions to produce nonsense (the 
concrete dispositions each of us – as philosophers – have to produce nonsense in particular ways) 
could be worked on as soon as they broke surface:cclxvi  
 
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. 
the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: 
and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate 
to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method 
would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching 
him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method. (TLP 6.53) 
 
Since such a direct approach is not always possible, however, Wittgenstein produces a book – the 
Tractatus – that aims to achieve a similar result. The method of this book is intended to be 
similarly interactive: it involves engaging the reader in an internal dialogue, similar to that which 
would take place in the more direct approach. cclxvii  Implicit here is the idea that it is only by 
personally engaging in such a dialectic struggle that the required transformation – the 
transformation in our disposition to use signs – can be achieved.  
 In order to effect this transformation in us – that is, with this purpose in mind –
  Wittgenstein presents us with a careful arrangement of sentences in the form of the 
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Tractatus.cclxviii  I suggest that Wittgenstein uses the sentences of the Tractatus in at least two 
different ways. Some of these sentences he uses in a relatively direct manner as instructions (akin 
to imperative commands) that aim to provide us with psychological reminders of the know-how 
already implicit in our everyday use of linguistic and mental signs. One such an example would 
be: ‘A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.’ (TLP 
2.21). This is the kind of reminder that may prove of help when we find ourselves captivated by, 
for instance, the metaphysical notion of an object-like-non-object-like self (the thinking subject), 
as in the solipsism discussion. In other cases, Wittgenstein uses sentences in an intentionally 
ambiguous manner, to produce puzzles, with the deliberate purpose of getting us to exercise our 
everyday thinking and linguistic abilities on them.cclxix As we saw in previous chapters, these 
intentionally ambiguous propositions include: 
 
‘The world is my world’ (TLP 5.62) 
 
The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to law. (TLP 
[PM] 6.3) 
 
[…] only connexions that are subject to principle [or law – gesetzmäßige] are thinkable. 
(TLP [PM] 6.361) 
 
So too at death the world […] comes to an end. (TLP [PM] 6.431) 
 
Interestingly, both Engelmann and Ramsey, who were amongst the first to read the Tractatus and 
to discuss it with Wittgenstein, mention that he deliberately includes ambiguous sentences in this 
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book, as part of his philosophical method. In his Memoir, Engelmann makes the following 
remark concerning Wittgenstein’s use of brackets in ‘(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the 
same.)’ in TLP 6.421:  
 
But the statement [in TLP 6.421] is put in parentheses, said by the way, as something not 
really meant to be uttered, yet something that should not be passed over in silence at that 
point. And this is done as a form of a reminder recalling to the understanding reader an 
insight which he is assumed to possess in any case. (Engelmann Letters and Memoir (1967) 
p. 124.)cclxx  
 
Similarly, in a letter to his mother dated 20th September 1923, Ramsey writes:  
 
His [Wittgenstein’s] idea of his book is not that anyone by reading it will understand his 
ideas, but that some day someone will think then out again for himself, and will derive 
great pleasure from finding in this book their exact expressions. […] Some of 
[Wittgenstein’s] sentences are intentionally ambiguous having an ordinary meaning and a 
more difficult meaning which he also believes.cclxxi  
 
 In the light of this, we would, I suggest, do well to revisit the following entries, in which 
Wittgenstein discusses ‘the propositions of logic’: 
 
The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions, by combining 
them into propositions which say nothing. 
 This method could be called a zero-method. In a logical proposition propositions are 
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brought into equilibrium with one another, and the state of equilibrium then shows how 
these propositions must be logically constructed. (TLP 6.121) 
 
Whence it follows that we can get on without logical propositions, for we can recognize in 
an adequate notation the formal properties of the propositions by mere inspection. (TLP 
6.122) 
 
The context in which these remarks are presented suggests that Wittgenstein uses the phrase 
‘propositions of logic’, at least in part, to indicate the logical postulates discussed by Russell and 
others (cf. TLP 6.1223). At the same time, his remark to the effect that ‘we can actually do 
without logical propositions’, together with the knowledge that it is part of his method to use 
sentences ambiguously for different interrelated purposes in the Tractatus, suggests that he could 
– in addition – be using this phrase (‘propositions of logic’) to pick out the tautological 
expressions that he himself he presents as puzzles in the Tractatus – expressions such as ‘the 
world is my world’. The process that leads us to see propositions such as these as altogether 
senseless and unsubstantive (e.g. the process discussed in chapters 2 and 3, in connection to 
solipsism), certainly leaves us with the eerie sense of having been involved in a zero-sum game 
(cf. TLP 6.121) – a game that ultimately does away with whatever substantive insights we 
seemed to be initially gaining.  
 In the light of this, the following remarks by Paul Engelmann strike a particularly strong 
chord:  
 
Yet we do not understand Wittgenstein unless we realize that it was philosophy that 
mattered to him and not logic, which merely happened to be the only suitable tool for 
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elaborating his world picture. 
  This the Tractatus accomplishes in sovereign fashion, ending up with implacable 
consistency by nullifying the result, so that the communication of its basic thoughts, or 
rather of its basic tendency — which, according to its own findings, cannot on principle be 
effected by direct methods — is yet achieved indirectly. He nullifies his own world picture, 
together with the 'houses of cards' of philosophy (which at that time at least he thought he 
had made collapse), so as to show 'how little is achieved when these problems are solved'. 
What he wants to demonstrate is that such endeavours of human thought to 'utter the 
unutterable' are a hopeless attempt to satisfy man's eternal metaphysical urge.cclxxii 
 
Wittgenstein uses the sentences of the Tractatus with a particular purpose. This purpose is the 
clarification of propositions and thoughts, that is, the re-orientation of our disposition to use signs 
away from nonsense. The propositions of the Tractatus have a purpose to serve for as long as we 
continue to be drawn towards metaphysics and towards a confused approach to logic, 
representation and ethics. Once we overcome this pull, however, the propositions of the Tractatus 
no longer have a function: they become redundant, that is, purposeless. I suggest that it is at this 
point that they become nonsensical. Hence, the point at which the Tractatus fully achieves its 
own purpose of clarification is precisely the point at which we come to recognise that it is time to 
let go of the sentences of the book, just as we might let go of a ladder once we have used it for 
the purpose of climbing to the top: 
 
‘My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me, 
eventually [that is, ‘at the end’ – ‘am Ende’ in the original] recognizes them as nonsensical, 
when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw 
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away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
 He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright.’ (TLP [PM] 
6.54)  
 
Whilst they are used as steps for a genuine, albeit psychological, purpose (i.e. that of acting as 
reminders), philosophical and logical propositions are not nonsensical. As soon as they have 
served their purpose, however, it becomes nonsensical to continue entertaining these sentences as 
they are used in the Tractatus – just as it would be nonsensical to continue going up and down 
the ladder once we have achieved our aim of getting to the top. In the more direct, face-to-face 
method, this would have been the point at which the interlocutor would have ended the 
discussion – that is, would have opted for silence. Hence, Wittgenstein’s decision to follow on 
from TLP 6.54 with the final entry of the Tractatus:  
 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (TLP [PM] 7) 
 
The process of clarification in which the Tractatus engages us therefore culminates in our coming 
to recognise that there is no longer any purpose to be served by the propositions in the book: it 
involves coming to recognise them, at the end (‘am Ende’ – TLP 6.54), as nonsensical and 
therefore opting for silence with respect to them.cclxxiii  
 
3. The Continuity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy 
 
I would like to use this final section of the Conclusion to make some remarks concerning the way 
in which my reading of the Tractatus helps to shed light on the question of the continuity in 
	   219	  
Wittgenstein’s thinking.cclxxiv Consider first the question of his approach to philosophy itself. 
Having undergone a markedly metaphysical period in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein has, by the 
time he writes the Tractatus, become persuaded of the need to resist any approach that presents 
philosophy as yielding substantive insights. Philosophy, properly understood, offers no 
substantive (i.e. no new or genuinely informative) theses of any kind. In the Tractatus, becoming 
clear in our use of signs involves coming to recognise (and to treat) any supposedly substantive 
philosophical insights as falling a part in our hands. This applies in a similar manner to 
purportedly substantive insights from metaphysics (as in restrictive solipsism), the philosophy of 
science (as in the Causal Necessity View), philosophical logic (as in Russell’s use of axioms) or 
ethics (e.g. Schopenhauer’s ethical propositions). Philosophy should be regarded, not so much as 
a subject, but as a dialectical activity of clarification: an activity aimed at fine-tuning our 
practical linguistic understanding and doing so by way of a combination of reminders and puzzles. 
Wittgenstein’s suspicion of any approaches to philosophy that present it as yielding substantive 
theses and his commitment to philosophy understood as the interactive, clarificatory activity of 
bringing us back to the know-how we already possess would remain with him into his later 
philosophical period. So does his implicit trust in the idea that everyday – as opposed to 
traditional philosophical – language is basically in order. 
 
Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the 
end only describe it. […] 
 It leaves everything as it is. (PI: 124)      
 
Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – 
Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden 
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is of no interest to us. 
 The name ‘philosophy’ might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries 
and inventions. (PI: 126)  
 
The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections [Erinnerungen] for a 
particular purpose [Zweck]. (PI: 127)cclxxv 
 
In the Tractatus, the philosophical process of clarification aims at fine-tuning our disposition to 
use signs in senseful propositions, understood in a highly particular way.cclxxvi  Although the 
notion of use remains central to Wittgenstein’s thinking, his understanding of this notion 
undergoes important transformations in his later period. By the time he writes the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein has come to regard his former approach to use and to representation as unduly 
essentialistic. Consider the following series of consecutive entries: 
 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.5): ‘The general form of the proposition is: This is how 
things are.’ (PI 114) 
 
A picture held us captive. (PI 115)  
When philosophers use a word – ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, ‘proposition/sentence’, 
‘name’ – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word 
ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? – What we do is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 116) 
 
The Tractatus suggests that there is an essence to the linguistic use of signs: using signs to 
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express senseful propositions involves, in essence, using them in a manner that reflects that 
propositions are bivalent, bipolar and ultimately analysable into logically independent 
arrangements of names with simple meanings. In the Tractatus, the practice of using signs 
sensefully is therefore logically demarcated: a use of signs that does not reflect bivalence, for 
instance, simply does not express sense. In his later philosophical period, Wittgenstein abandons 
this essentialist approach to use and to the notion of a linguistic practice. His discussions of 
language-games and of family resemblance are intended to mark precisely this shift from logical 
essentialism to inessentialism:  
 
Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. – For 
someone might object against me: ‘You make things easy for yourself! You talk about all 
sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and 
therefore of language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into 
language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that 
once gave you the most headache, the part about the general form of the proposition and of 
language.’ 
 And this is true. – Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, 
I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use 
the same word for all – but there are many different kinds of affinity between them. And on 
account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all ‘languages’. (PI 65)cclxxvii  
 
I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than ‘family 
resemblances’. (PI 67) 
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The shift from the earlier to the later approaches to language is sometimes portrayed in the 
literature as a shift from the so-called Picture Theory to the notion of use.cclxxviii  I suggest that this 
is misleading. In my view, the shift is better captured by speaking of a move from an essentialist, 
logical notion of use to a different notion of use characterised by non-essentialism and family 
resemblances. Since the essentialism of the Tractatus is an essentialism in our practical 
understanding, this shift can also be portrayed as a shift in Wittgenstein’s understanding of a 
practice: the shift from the notion of a practice characterised by truth-functionally determinate 
(ones is tempted to say binary) moves to the notion of language-games involving resemblance-
based moves.  
A similar discontinuity can be found in Wittgenstein’s treatment of the relation between 
language and thought. Tractarian essentialism results in an overly cerebral treatment of 
representation, whereby using a sentence to express a senseful proposition automatically involves 
expressing a thought – so that language is always accompanied by thinking, as if thoughts were 
the shadows of propositions. This is an idea that Wittgenstein later comes to criticise, notably in 
the Blue and Brown Books: 
The shadow, as we think of it, is some sort of a picture; in fact, something very much like 
an image which comes before our mind’s eye; and this again is something not unlike a 
painted representation in the ordinary sense [...] But it is absolutely essential for the picture 
which we imagine the shadow to be that it is what I shall call a ‘picture by similarity’. I 
don’t mean by this that it is a picture similar to what it is intended to represent, but that it is 
a picture which is correct only when it is similar to what it represents. One might use for 
this kind of picture the word ‘copy’. (BB: 36 – 37) 
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If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with 
its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. (BB: 37)   
In the Tractatus, the practice of using signs to express senseful propositions and thoughts has a 
clearly demarcated essence that implies logically precise moves. These moves (encapsulated in 
the notion of essential logical form) are understood to permeate everyday language and the 
language of the natural sciences, insofar as these naturalistic systems are also logical ones. In his 
later philosophical period, this emphasis on an essential set of moves is abandoned: the shift to 
the notions of language-game and family resemblance is precisely a shift away from this idea of a 
logically demarcated practice. At the same time, it is striking to find, at the heart of the Tractarian 
distinction between logical and naturalistic forms, the precursor to this very idea of a language-
game. For, in the Tractatus, naturalistic forms (i.e. the accidental representational forms of 
natural languages and the optional forms of the natural sciences) capture non-essential, accidental 
linguistic systems. Naturalistic forms produce unified linguistic systems, governed by different 
rules and principles – systems that are, in these respects, not unlike language-games. The 
parallels between Tractarian naturalistic systems and language-games become all the more 
striking when one considers that the Tractatus remarks on natural science systems (notably, TLP 
6.341 – 6.343) first emerge in the Notebooks as early as in December 1914. What is more, in the 
Notebooks, Wittgenstein comments in the midst of these remarks: ‘This I have felt for a long time’ 
(NB 6.12.14).cclxxix Since central aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the natural sciences 
survive into his middle and later periods (notably in the idea explored in chapter 4, section 1.2, 
that scientific causal systems obscure possibilities) we might do well to conclude that it is 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of the natural sciences that displays the strongest elements of continuity 
in his philosophy.
